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The French philosopher and erstwhileMaoistmilitant
Guy Lardreau (1947-2008) was the first to admit that
much of his work was haunted by a single problem,
one posed by the revolutionary political history of the
twentieth century.1 The great revolutions in Russia
and China, and several other places inspired by their
example, pursued radical change in the literal sense.
They had dug down to the root of things, and tried to
uproot them. They had sought to break patterns of
injustice and inequality so entrenched that they had
been suffered, for centuries, as part of the immutable
order of things. More than a mere break with histor-
ical tendencies, the great revolutions thus aspired to
change human nature itself, to shake it to its most ap-
parently ‘unchangeable’ foundations.2 They did not
hesitate to take up Rousseau’s famous challenge, to
‘denature’ humanity and make the world anew – and
it’s no accident that in Lardreau’s early work, along-
side Mao and Lenin, the key source of inspiration
is Rousseau, and a sharply anti-Kantian version of
Rousseau at that.3 The most sincere revolutionaries
vehemently rejected the sort of critical limitations
Kant insisted on, limitations that, for Lardreau as
for Marx and so many other Marxists, position him
first and foremost as an anti-revolutionary thinker:
they had sought precisely to force both history and
nature into line with the ideal and uncompromising
principles of reason.
To invoke the metaphor first adopted in Lardr-
eau’smost famous book,L’Ange, co-writtenwithChris-
tian Jambet in 1976, and which endures as the cent-
ral figure of his last published writings, the modern
revolutions can thus be understood as essentially an-
gelic projects. The term ‘Angel’, to cite what is per-
haps Lardreau’s clearest explanation of his usage, ‘is
the name of the possibility that human nature, for so
long established in a certain way, might change from
top to bottom.’ For a particular historical period this
possibility took on a ‘political face’ – the period of la
Grande Politique, between the French and Cambodian
revolutions (FD, 83).
After enthusiastically embracing the apparent
consequences of China’s Great Proletarian Cultural
Revolution in the late 1960s and early 1970s, how-
ever, Lardreau soon came to the conclusion that any
genuinely radical revolution could in actuality lead
only to catastrophe. Actual revolutions led to the guil-
lotine, the gulag, and the killing fields of Cambodia.
The more ardent a revolution’s desire to build heaven
on earth, the more hellish its worldly consequences.
By the end of his life, the only difference Lardreau
recognised between ‘legitimate’ French revolution-
ary figures like Robespierre and Chaumette, on the
one hand, and reviled war criminals like Goebbels or
Pol Pot, on the other, is that, at least over the longer
historical term, ‘the former succeeded whereas the
latter failed. Vae victis ...’ (FD, 24). Ever since its true
visage was exposed in Cambodia, the ‘political face’
of the Angel has vanished without trace, and without
any prospect of return (even if angelic hope as such
always persists, as an eternal yearning or possibility)
(FD, 83).
Something about the very desire or will to ‘bend
political power to the highest ends of reason’, as Lardr-
eau suggests in several late texts, seemed doomed to
‘result in the necessary reversal of best into worst.’4
The real source of this necessity, he eventually de-
cides, lies in the quality of such a will itself – revolu-
tionary political will, in other words, seems to operate
as a sort of malevolent inversion of Kant’s conception
of a morally ‘good will’. Where the latter figured as
the only thing ‘in the world, or indeed even beyond it,
that could be considered good without limitation’,5
there is likewise no limit to the evil of the former.
Lardreau’s great problem, then, is to understood how
political projects undertaken with the very best of
intentions invariably turn bad, and ‘not because the
will behind this undertaking became lazy or forgetful,
but on account of this will itself.’6
Lardreau’s chief concern, early and late, is with
the nature of such political will. I addressed Lardr-
eau’s early voluntarism– in particular as developed in
his first book Le Singe d’or [The Golden Monkey, 1973]
– in an article published in an earlier issue of this
journal (RP 190). What is unusual about Lardreau’s
subsequent turn away from revolutionary zeal in the
mid to late 1970s is that, unlike some of his comrades
in French Maoist political circles, he did not simply
reverse course, and fling himself with equal enthusi-
asm into the arms of neo-liberal reaction.7 Instead
he sought to combine a version of his original revolu-
tionary intransigence,while restoring a strict, broadly
Kantian demarcation of rational and moral ideals, on
the one hand, and historical reality or actuality, on
the other. Only unconditional affirmation is worthy
of the ideal, but any attempt to actualise or imple-
ment it is itself criminal. In his final, posthumously
published book, Faces de l’Ange déchu, Lardreau puts
it in increasingly strident if not openly ‘inquisitorial’
terms: the only ‘perversion that cannot be forgiven,
the only irremissible misdeed or sin ..., is the bad will
to realise the Idea’ (FD, 170).
Affirmation of the ideal, in short, becomes a more
and more emphatically spiritual exercise, purged of
all worldly contamination. As a political figure, the
angel can now appear only as ‘fallen [déchu]’, as a
figure of renunciation and withdrawal. In the end,
this logic will allow him to affirm both the enduring
reason of the Maoist slogan ‘on a raison de se révolter’
– it is right or reasonable to rebel – while embracing
the most reactionary (in the literal sense) aspects
of French counter-revolutionary thought: the ultra-
conservative Catholic restoration urged by thinkers
like Joseph de Maistre and Louis Bonald. Like these
bitter enemies of the Enlightenment and of all ideas
of historical ‘progress’, Lardreau concludes that the
French Revolution found its essence and ‘its highest
truth in the guillotine’. If ‘with respect to the Revolu-
tion, all that matters to thought has come from the
Counter-Revolution’ (FD, 101n.6), this is because only
the counter-revolutionary thinkers were equipped to
grasp both the material and the ‘Sublime’ aspects of
the Terror (FD, 24). Bonald had it right: ‘only religion
can understand politics’ (FD, 133).
If his Maoist work of the early 1970s was entirely
oriented by ‘an act of faith’ in the masses and the pro-
foundly rational ‘rightness’ of their revolt,8 we can
analyse Lardreau’s subsequent attempt to separate
the domains of faith and actuality across three dis-
tinct through overlapping moments, in a sequence
that for the sake of simplicity might be summed up
as a retreat from Rousseau’s politics to Kant’s moral-
ity. In L’Ange (1976) he still affirms the will to revolt
against the evils of the world, while acknowledging
that so long as it commits to an actual emancipatory
political project then revolt may always be deluded,
co-opted and harnessed to new forms of oppression.
In LeMonde (1978) hewithdraws revolt from any polit-
ical engagement with the world at all, in order to take
refuge in an uncompromising ‘moral attitude’, one
that upholds our duty to respect the imprescriptible
rights that should apply to every individual in all situ-
ations. In La Véracité (1993), the explicitly Kantian
framework for this moral attitude is re-affirmed but
reframed along still more strictly ‘negative’ lines, in
keeping with the purely ‘supersensible’ and supra-
actual quality of our freedom to posit an uncondi-
tional moral law.9
I
Co-written with Lardreau’s long-time comrade Chris-
tian Jambet (who shared both Lardreau’s political con-
victions and his erudite fascination with ascetic spir-
ituality and esoteric religion), and long considered
a sort of ‘cult classic’ on the experimental fringes of
recent French philosophy, L’Ange (1976) retains the
same basic political orientation as Singe d’or (1973),
framed by an archetypal scenario that pits the ‘rebel’
(the insurgent, the dissident, the heretic ...) against
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the ‘master’ (the boss, the Party, the state ...).10 In the
Lacanian terms that Lardreau now begins to adopt,
what defines any master is the command ‘cède sur ton
désir’ (LM, 85) – ‘give up on your desire’ – whereas
every rebel rejects precisely this imperative. Across
both Singe and L’Ange, ‘what I’ve been constantly say-
ing is that a world without master must be possible’,11
i.e. aworld of absolute justice. The fundamental issue
remains a matter of making a stark choice, between
the ‘side of the people’ or that of their oppressors (LA,
42). Popular revolt or submissive resignation: these
alternatives continue to define the political spectrum.
In this sense there is no retreat here from the
earlier commitment to Maoism,12 and far from reneg-
ation what Lardreau seeks is to ‘go still further in my
imperfect conversion ...; I still don’t claim to be doing
anything else than pursuing a Maoist philosophy.’13
Like Singe, L’Ange continues to reject the idea that
a world without mastery or oppression might ever
come about through some immanent form of neces-
sity or progress, some development of the existing
conditions of oppression, on themodel of socialism as
emerging out from capitalist industrialisation. Genu-
ine, i.e. ‘cultural’ revolution, in the Maoist sense, re-
mains the contrary of progress or maturation, and of
the anticipatory knowledge induced from the logic of
progress. To engage in revolution is here to plunge
into a project that thwarts all anticipation of what is
to come, and all ‘planning’ for the future. Cultural
revolution does not complete or accelerate what is
established but breaks abruptly with it, on the model
of an apocalypse. To revolt is to resist the temptation
to ‘know what is to come’, to avoid ‘predicting the
new’, and ‘the first principle of cultural revolution’
remains one of humility in the face of its imminent
future. ‘I can never say what should come, since if
what comes is new then this must exceed what I had
foreseen’, as a matter of course.14
Like all of Lardreau’s subsequent work,L’Ange also
continues to affirm forms of an ascetic, self-sacrificing
discipline and commitment, at the furthest remove
of any anarcho-désirant call to ‘go with the flow’. As
with Singe, as far as desire and the body are concerned
what is at stake in L’Ange remains ‘not the liberation
but the abolition of the body’.15 Angel and monkey
might thus seem to have more in common than these
titles imply. Unlike Singe, however, L’Ange is newly
concerned with the way that even the purest and
most well-intentioned forms of such dedication may
nonetheless be accommodated within, or usurped by,
mechanisms of domination. A couple of years on from
its dissolution, Lardreau is ready to admit that ‘the
Gauche Prolétarienne might have been one of the
discourses that the Master made use of it, and that
he will continue to make use of, as a mechanism for
enabling his own metamorphosis.’16 In L’Ange, the
issue is most starkly posed in the sections of the book
that evoke the exemplary experience of those early
Christian ascetics (Saint Jerome, Chrysostomos and
various others) who both lived and declared an espe-
cially intransigent form of ‘absolute revolt’ against
the prevailing way of the world (LA, 93–99). What
is primary, in this sequence, is the moment of abso-
lute zeal that inspired these Red Guards of Christ in
the decades that followed his crucifixion, ‘this surreal
crowd that swarms in the deserts of the Orient, these
monks withwasted bellies, their bodies laceratedwith
chains, these ruined figures whipped bywind and rain,
these worm-eaten but radiant stylites, these volun-
tary madmen’ (LA, 101). The early monastic thinkers,
inspired by a resolutelyManichean conception of real-
ity, propose their own version of cultural revolution
avant la lettre. They invert every accepted form of
value, renounce all inheritance, refuse any loyalty to
family and familiarity, deny the body, reject sexual
difference and desire, affirm the all-or-nothing simpli-
city of redemption, pursue a heroic anonymity, adopt
a permanent posture of self-criticism, embrace the
most severe forms of frugality and discipline. They ac-
cept that ‘the path of saintliness is a path of struggle
alone’ (LA, 148).
But how then could it happen, ask Lardreau and
Jambet, that this uncompromising posture of revolt
was so easily and so quickly accommodated within a
new configuration of mastery? How could a discourse
of pure revolt, directed against the figure of mastery
as such, directed against the very survival of society,
in turn become the witless ‘instrument of the Master,’
and allow itself to be used, as a sort of safely marginal-
ised lunatic fringe, in ways that help consolidate the
social and institutional mainstream? How, in short,
was the uncompromising discourse of saints bent to
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the base needs of an emergent church?
The answer, which applies both to early Christian-
ity and to the revolutionary projects of the twentieth
century, relies on conversion of cultural revolution
into a merely ‘ideological’ revolution. An ideological
revolution is that ‘miracle’ which succeeds in redu-
cing the most subversive of ideals and practices to a
‘docile instrument’ of order, by isolating their most
dedicated proponents (now invested with a special
‘vocation’ or ‘profession’) from their fellows and put-
ting them back to work, in cloistered obedience to
the will of a new master (LA, 115). Whereas cultural
revolution rejects every form of mastery in the un-
mediated dualism of oppression/revolt, ideological
revolution mediates subjective responses to socio-
historical ‘causes’ and economic conditions and in-
tegrates rebellion within a rational historical order
or development – and in the process it transforms
the critique of mastery into the mere substitution of
one master for another (LA, 151–52). The quality of
the will involved is thereby fundamentally changed.
Determined through coordination with the apparent
‘necessity’ of its material base, ‘ideological revolution
is, subjectively, a mitigated will [une volonté mitigée],
and objectively, a will to mitigation’, whereas the sole
‘law of cultural revolution’ remains a ‘will of absolute
purity’ (LA, 110; cf. LM, 19–20), a will to pursue ‘the
deliberate, systematic inversion of all the values of
this world’ (LA, 87).
Recognition of the means by which the zeal of the
early Christian ascetics was harnessed to the needs of
a new institutional order allows Lardreau to see how
his own cultural revolution had been usurped, how
‘we too have no doubt simply been a moment of an
ideological revolution that made use of us, and which
in a sensewe completely failed to understand’, leaving
us as little more than obedient pawns of ‘the will of
the Master’ (LA, 135). By 1976, Lardreau had already
come to the conclusion that any attempt to change
the world by political means, for instance by organ-
ising a political party on the Leninist model, could
only lead to variations on a Stalinist outcome.17
A rejection of allmastery, Lardreau now argues,
must also include a rejection of the very will, striving
or desire for a world without mastery. This is because
Lardreau now accepts, following Lacan, that desire
as such is the domain of the master. ‘We have a very
elevated idea of the Master, an elevated idea of his
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history, and ... like Lacan, we think that nothing that
relates to desire escapes him.’18 (Following L’Ange,
Lacan will figure above all in Lardreau’s work as the
prophet who spoke an uncomfortable but oft-cited
truth to the young would-be revolutionaries of May
68: ‘What you aspire to as revolutionaries is a mas-
ter. You will get one.’19) Since political and sexual
desire obey the same logic, the idea of ‘sexual liber-
ation’ must thus be dismissed as an especially acute
contradiction in terms – which accounts, parenthet-
ically, for Lardreau’s critiques of Sade, Deleuze and
Lyotard. Genuine revolt must be a-sexual or extra-
sexual, and the first reason why Lardreau and Jambet
now conceive of the revolutionary as ‘angelic’ should
be taken quite literally. ‘This image of the Angel must
be understood very simply ...: a body without sex.’20
Or rather – as a body without body, a body purged of
all flesh and material desire, one dedicated to noth-
ing other than ‘perpetual praise’ of its transcendent
creator (LA, 104).
The further and deeper reason why Lardreau ad-
mits that to wait for the angel’s advent is the only
way to preserve ‘the hope of revolution’ is that this
serves to illustrate the actual ‘conditions of possib-
ility’ of rebellion, i.e. to illustrate their necessary
non-actuality (LA, 36, cf. 79). Not only is cultural
revolution doomed to ideological recuperation in his-
tory but the alternative, the successful realisation of
cultural revolution, would herald nothing less than
the end of history and of humanity as we know it, and
thus the end of all realisation too.
Pushed to its limit, Lardreau’s position now cul-
minates, in effect, in a double wager – first on rebel-
lion rather than submission, and then on rebellion’s
necessary failure rather than possible success. The
first wager is a matter of pure incantation, without
reason or cause: ‘The Angel must come’, since the
alternative is intolerable despair (LA, 36, 70). Even
if mastery has always triumphed, so far, and even if
revolt serves only to reinvigorate oppression, never-
theless ‘once again, and come what may, we will make
the mad wager: the Angel, whose annunciation it is
our turn to declare, has always been defeated – but he
will finally triumph in an unprecedented revolution’
(LA, 152). Lardreau accepts that history has backed
him into a corner, but not yet that hemust yield; what
remains is the logic of the gamble or wager as such, in
its undecidability, demanding that between the two
worlds, the world of what has been and the world of
what might be, and their respective actors, ‘one must
choose [il y a à choisir]’ (LA, 153). Lardreau nowmakes
of this un-reasonable and discontinuous quality of
revolt its highest virtue, an index of its unassimilat-
able resistance to integration in the rational progress
of history. It is in the form of a pure leap that Lardr-
eau and Jambet seek, ‘against all forms of power and
domination, and in spite of everything, to maintain
the hope that another world is possible’, by ‘pushing
right to the end, right to the point of paroxysm, the
logic of rebellion’ (LA, 10, 13). If L’Ange still retains an
account of revolutionary will, it is already stretched
close to the point where it becomes indistinguishable
from a leap of faith.
The second wager, however, is now indissociable
from the first, and becomes more urgently so over
time. Every revolt runs the risk of barbaric inhuman-
ity; revolutions can only prevail in a world geared
to suppress them through recourse to violence on a
massive scale. On this point, after Stalin, after the
Gulag, and after the brutality of the Cultural Revolu-
tion, the Khmer revolution in Cambodia that began
in 1975 marks the point of no return. The shift from
cautious anticipation of this revolution to a definitive
judgement of its actual consequences, furthermore,
marks the stark dividing line between L’Ange and Le
Monde, which Lardreau and Jambet published two
years later. Lardreau will then be ready to bet that
any and every revolutionary project, once it is put into
practice, must always fail. If the practice of political
will requires the direct conjunction of an intention or
purpose and its execution or actualisation, Lardreau’s
recognition of the Cambodian catastrophe, shortly
after the publication of L’Ange, marks the definitive
end of his defence of such a practice, and confirms
his re-orientation of the will from politics to morality
(LM, 13).
II
The concluding reference to the Khmer Rouge, in
L’Ange, restates in a single phrase the basic argument
of the book. ‘If the Cambodians are right to revolt’ (as
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a matter of course), the actual outcome of the Khmer
Rouge project, whatever it might be, will not itself
resolve or ‘suppress our transcendental question, re-
garding the possible autonomy of revolt itself’ (LA,
233). In other words, revolt in Cambodia, like any re-
volt anywhere else, can always be justified as an end
in itself, as an immediate reaction to oppression –
and a few years after L’Ange was published its authors
readily admitted that ‘it’s true that the Lin-Biaoist
sympathies we had at the time allowed us to hope
that the Khmer revolution would be victorious, and
to feel sympathetic towards it.’21 The rapid accumu-
lation of evidence of Khmer crimes, however, did not
so much confound an earlier endorsement of their
actual revolution, as cement Lardreau’s answer to
precisely that transcendental question which already
accompanied it in L’Ange, and which now receives an
unequivocal answer. Khmer atrocities provide clear
proof that anyone who still seeks to rebel against or
at least limit the violence of mastery and oppression
must first deny any actual application of ‘the possible
autonomy of revolt itself’, any worldly or political
possibility of moving ‘beyond the history of the mas-
ter.’22 From now on, Lardreau will tacitly accept that,
as far as justice and morality are concerned, the only
kingdom that matters is indeed ‘not of this world’.
This conclusion only follows, of course, if we first
accept the Khmer’s own self-description more or less
at face value, as Lardreau seems to do both before
and after the revolution in Cambodia – as if they
really were nothing more than ruthless idealists who
sought to abolish rather than reinstitute mastery, as
if they really were driven by a revolutionary pursuit
of absolute justice and equality. Lardreau and Jam-
bet interpret the Khmer sequence not as an excep-
tionally brutal engagement with some of the many
constraints that characterise Cambodia’s situation
(and the situation of weakened peripheral states in
the capitalist world system more generally), but ex-
clusively as an illustration of what must always hap-
pen when a ‘will to purity’ fully resolves to purge
society of oppression. Such an angelic will, they con-
clude,must ultimately encourage a barbaric ‘will to
create a community of bodies without flesh [de corps
sans chair], bodies stripped of desire and self-regard,
a community without social ties.’23 In keeping with
this new invocation of necessity and this newly inexor-
able logic of revolution, the revelation of Cambodia’s
killing fields marked for Lardreau, as for many of his
contemporaries, a definitive break with the Marxian
pursuit of political power as a means of realising free-
dom and overcoming poverty and injustice.24 From
now on there will be no better indication of one’s re-
lative ‘maturity’, Lardreau suggests following Kant,
than the readiness with which one accepts that we can
andmust live ‘without great hopes or expectations.’25
It should be stressed, however, that such read-
iness remains as much a wager as was the original
revolutionary project itself, albeit now a wager on
failure rather than success. From the mid 1970s, as
Alberto Toscano notes, Lardreau’s understanding of
revolution in general comes to be shaped by a quite
specific judgement of failure and disaster, the fail-
ure of Cultural Revolution in Lin Piao’s China along
with the various failures to imitate or radicalise it
abroad.26 Even if one were to agree that the narrow
category of ‘failure’ might be the most economical
way to characterise these projects, Lardreau makes
no attempt to explain why these particular failures
might warrant the extension of this characterisation
to all revolutionary projects (for instance those un-
dertaken in Cuba and other parts of Latin America).
If Lardreau does not concern himself with such polit-
ical judgements it is because by the late 1970s he has
convinced himself that ‘what we are living and ex-
periencing today isn’t simply the repeated failure of
revolutions to fulfil their programme to bring happi-
ness to the people (which justified them in the eyes
of simple souls) but the failure of the very Idea of
Revolution.’ What has failed, and failed definitively,
is the very idea that ‘political struggle might radic-
ally transform people’s lives’ (LM, 13). This failure
is something that has now taken place, irredeemably,
and Lardreau’s judgement stands without appeal (FD,
44, 146).
If the idea itself has failed, and failed irredeem-
ably, then its every instance must no doubt fail as a
matter of course, and we might say that for Lardreau
what will be at issue from now on, strictly speaking,
is not the relative successive or failure of this or that
project, but the need for any project to retreat without
reservation from the very dimension inwhich itmight
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either succeed or fail, i.e. to retreat from its very ex-
istence and temporality as a project tout court. In
Le Monde, even those fading traces of revolutionary
political affirmation that had persisted in L’Ange are
purged without remainder, so as to count only ‘for
nothing, strictly’ (LM, 279). Long before he writes his
last, explicitly counter-revolutionary texts, Lardreau
had reached the conclusion that any prospect of ‘ra-
tional politics’ is dead and buried: ‘in my view there
is no longer any clear and distinct idea of politics –
which means that politics is no more’; the ‘concept
of politics has died’ and politics can no longer be
thought by any philosophy worthy of the name (FD,
43, 58).
In other words, what is now at issue is the pos-
sibility of an alternative idea that might ground the
eternal legitimacy of revolt, without running the risk
of its actual success or failure. If the political question
is inevitably consumed in the violence of social dis-
solution and re-constitution, from now on the philo-
sophical question will ask whether there might be
some wholly ‘real’ dimension beyond all such consti-
tutional force, i.e. a dimension that might serve both
as a secure basis for the determination of the will and
as a foundation for the certainty that it is indeed still,
always and everywhere, right to revolt.27 Confronted
with the world’s reality and injustice, where might
we find ‘the point that resists’ the whole way of the
world, the point from which we might refuse all the
compromises we make to accommodate ourselves to
the ‘reality’ we inhabit? Where might we find ‘the
granite point from which a certain deduction will be
possible’, one unmediated by reality or compromise, ‘a
point of the eminently “real”, therefore, in the sense
of being irreducible, inescapable, imperative – but
one, nonetheless, that “reality” never takes into ac-
count’ (LM, 40)?
Lardreau finds this point or dimension – and with
it the key to his later philosophy as a whole– in Kant’s
idea of transcendental or extra-worldly freedom, un-
derstood in practice as the freedom to posit an un-
conditionally binding moral law, such that ‘freedom
and unconditional practical law reciprocally imply
each other.’28 Like most of his readers, Lardreau ac-
knowledges Kant as the first philosopher to posit an
unbridgeable gap between (a) the hypothetical, goal-
oriented and context-sensitive imperatives at issue in
politics and history, and (b) the unconditionally and
immediately binding categorical imperative of the
moral law, the law that everywhere obliges us to act
only on grounds that all other rational actors could
affirm, and in ways that treat ourselves and ‘all others
never merely as means but always at the same time
as ends in themselves.’29 In Kant’s moral law, which
transcends all historical particularity and every ‘chain’
of causation, Lardreau finds that ‘granite’ foundation
he had failed to find in political commitment. ‘The
moral law, as we know,holds absolutely– it is even the
only absolute that Reason can encounter, by which I
mean: that requires no hypothesis.’30 The law’s com-
mand is absolute both everywhere and always, for all
subjects and for all times, and for each time, for each
instance, for each subject as a subject or as any one
subject (LM, 98).
Kant’s moral law thus furnishes, Le Monde ar-
gues, a secure basis for universal human rights un-
derstood precisely as protections for dissident rebels
who might oppose the imposition of any actually-
coercive universal norms, and thus rights to safeguard
all ‘claims made on behalf of the singular, of the par-
ticular, against the despotic universal’ (LM, 58). Kant
proposes not one account of morality among others,
but an epochal discovery. ‘There is no Kantianmor-
ality’, properly speaking, for Kant’s philosophy pre-
scribes nothing less than morality itself, morality in
general: “‘Kantianism” exists only as the enunciation
of the conditions of possibility for morality as such’
(LV, 149). In due course, Lardreau will come to re-
cognise Kant’s insistence on the disjunctive relation
between politics and ethics as not only unpreceden-
ted but also
insurpassable, for I judge that no philosophy man-
aged to model the problem before him, and none fully
confronted it after him. Certainly not Hegel, who dis-
solves it by making the state, i.e. the highest figure
that philosophy could lend to politics, the realisation
of the ethical idea; nor Marx, even more so, whose
way of thinking obliges him to conceive of the moral
problem merely as an accident of politics.31
Between upholding the ‘moral attitude’ that con-
sists in recognising our duty to obey the law, and
participation in any worldly or political project that
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might try to change society or the course of history,
there is now an abyss without mediation. Every philo-
sophy of history and every philosophical conception
of the world ultimately seeks, one way or another,
to reconcile us with the order of this world, or its
projected future order, and thus serves to justify its
unjustifiable injustices. To be ‘philosophical’, in one
conventional sense of the word, is indeed to submit
to the way of the world (LM, 27–29). The freedom
to posit the moral law, by contrast, is precisely that
– a pure positing that is entirely ‘free’, gratuit, free
of any constituent link with nature or world. What
then allows Lardreau to pit his unconditional ‘moral
attitude’ against any merely ‘moral conception of the
world’ (i.e. any project to improve the world) is pre-
cisely its foundation in a purely regulative idea. In
Kantian terms,
everything depends on the point that Freedom is
an Idea, i.e. that it is impossible to decide between
the statements by which it can be either affirmed
or denied, if we approach it from the perspective of
speculative Reason; forever undecidable for science,
what is at stake is only illuminated if one has already
made the ethical choice. That Freedom is a postulate
means that, whatever rational legitimacy might sub-
sequently be conferred upon it, this legitimacy will
only be admissible and convincing for those who have
already made the choice to live morally (LM, 30–31).
There is no saving thosewhomight prefer tomake
the alternative choice, the ‘barbaric choice’ that com-
mits them to the sole dimension of the world. But for
those who choose freedom and morality, the essen-
tial question is no longer what can we do to improve
the world, or ‘what pure moral protestation is capable
of, against the rising insistence of barbarism in our
world.’ It is a matter, instead, since duty commands
capacity, of accepting the simplicity of the Kantian
imperative. It is enough to ask ‘what must I do?’, and
to disregard the doing itself as a secondary matter,
trusting as a matter of course that ‘we can do all that
we must’ (LM, 16–17). Following this line of think-
ing to its conclusion, ‘we will not say that freedom is
real, or that we can affirm things about freedom, but
that we must simply affirm it, since it is only “under
the idea of freedom” that we can conceive of a moral
attitude’ (LM, 40). The priority is now to dissociate
freedom from its affirmation ‘not merely from this
world, but from a world’, any world. It is enough, and
necessary, simply to ‘affirm that “there is freedom” [il
y a de la liberté], but without affirming it of anything,
neither of the world nor of man’ (LM, 38).
Inverting the priorities of Singe, in LeMonde Lardr-
eau stresses this difference between Kantian and
Rousseauist conceptions of autonomy. Kant’s formu-
lation of a self-legislating law, unlike Rousseau’s so-
cialised or actualised version, cannot force anyone
else to be free. The law ‘cannot itself oppress anyone;
it does not proceed before any tribunal, it does not
shape any institution, it distributes no power; it is
only ever expressed from the point of view of a [sin-
gular] subject, posed as such, and as irreducible to
every other – and no one can express the moral law
for someone else’ (LM, 97). It is precisely the effort to
actualise or apply the law that allows a dutiful moral
attitude to relapse into a mere assertion of mastery.
Kantian autonomy tumbles toward a proto-criminal
‘Rousseauist autonomy’ as soon as ‘a subject comes to
maintain that the universality of the law that he [il]
prescribes for himself must, in actuality, be realised’,
and thereby concludes that ‘it is no longer the law that
lends form to his will, but his will that gives the law its
content’ (LM, 98). To ward against this danger, which
Lardreau encounters in some of Kant’s own texts –
e.g. those which, like the essays on history, progress
and perpetual peace, suggest that ‘Kantian morality
wills [veut] its own realisation’ over the course of hu-
man affairs [LM, 35]), and which he might also have
found more emphatically in Heidegger’s insistence,
reading Kant’s moral philosophy, that ‘what is genu-
inely law-giving for willing is the actual pure willing
itself and nothing else’32 – the solution is to retreat to
the purely formal, extra-actual quality of ‘the Kantian
imperative, that the subject can always will that the
maxim of his action be [universalisable], but that he
never actually wills it thus’ (LM, 99). The supersens-
ible or noumenal domain must be respected as what
it must remain, as réel in a roughly Lacanian sense,
rather than embraced as the basis of a capacity that
might be realised in practice.33
On this condition, by abandoning all reference to
the will as practice or capacity in favour of the law as
unconditional duty, Lardreau can preserve his old op-
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position between submission and revolt, precisely by
abstracting the latter from its engagement with any
actual target or obstacle. Read in this way (and thus
against the voluntarist and indeed commanding or
‘masterful’ grain of so much of Kant’s own moral the-
ory), Lardreau’s Kant offers a kind of ‘autonomy that,
because it is entirely cut off from the political concep-
tion of the world, does not demand mastery’, while
still reminding each and every individual, always as
an individual, of one’s categorical duty: ‘do not give
up on your desire’ (LM, 97). Do not conform to the way
of the world. Precisely because it subtracts itself from
the complex chain of causes and interests that shape
the world, the Kantian moral attitude amounts to a
‘pure gesture of retreat or withdrawal, of subtraction
from obedience, through which, by stubbornly refus-
ing to give up, a subject thereby affirms himself as
autonomous. Kant with Lacan, in short.’34
The price Lardreau has to pay in order to sus-
tain this new formulation of revolt over submission,
however, is exorbitant. Since revolt is now indistin-
guishable from ‘retreat’ [retrait] it not only leaves the
world of oppression untouched, it also resonates all
too easily with a socio-economic world that is itself
beginning, in its incipient neoliberal reconfiguration
over the course of the 1970s, to privilege private in-
terests and de-regulated market ‘liberties’ over any
residual commitment to public goods and collective
projects. It resonates in particular with the familiar
liberal appeal to tolerance: you must not yield on
your desire, so long as your desire does not infringe
on the free pursuit of others’ desires (cf. LM, 104–
8). This is another consequence of privileging Kant
over Rousseau: rather than seek to fortify and concen-
trate a common interest in the collective good, Lardr-
eau’s moral attitude aspires only to a gentle or ‘soft
autonomy’, one that flaunts its harmless humility. ‘It
wants gentleness [douceur], the universal tolerance of
those small differences in which everyone finds their
small joys’ (LM, 110; cf. 16), free from the tempta-
tion of any great expectations in political action or
historical development.
What must remain excluded from consideration,
in this as in every stage of Lardreau’s work, is the
sphere of history in a broadly Hegelian or Marxist
sense, i.e. as a sphere in which cumulative strivings
for collective emancipation might contribute to ac-
tual [wirkliche] transformations over time. Lardreau
condemns such an understanding of history as one
that effectively serves, like earlier forms of theodicy,
to validate an immoral logic of instrumental expedi-
ency. Understood as a story of progress or liberation,
one guided by its promises and ideals, History with
a capital ‘H’ lends a meaning [sens], a direction and a
justification to the meaningless and unjustifiable suf-
fering caused by political violence, and thereby tries
to render the intolerable tolerable (LM, 24–29). In
Le Monde, Lardreau and Jambet conclude that L’Ange
itself, far from abandoning politics for spirituality,
had not gone far enough in the dissociation of moral-
ity from politics and history. Insofar as the figure of
the angel might still hold out some redemptive prom-
ise, did it not collude in justifying a history marked
by suffering and evil? ‘Did not the Angel give us, in
spite of our denials, a point of view on this particular
history’ – from a perspective outside it, yes, but nev-
ertheless one that made it possible to recognise an
‘intelligibility of History?’ (LM, 280).
After losing the fight to subordinate it to political
prescription in Singe, history figures after L’Ange only
as a domain of exile and alienation. The paradigm
for this, as for so much of Lardreau’s later work, is
established in the early Christian church, by the divi-
sion that separates the spiritual,monarchist approach
to redemption (guided by an immediate contempt
for the flesh, desire, and for all that might align us
with the ways of this world) and the rival ‘historicist
model’, whereby the Church is established as an insti-
tution designed to lead its people through the trials
and tribulations of this world, and to accept the world
as the sole theatre of salvation.35 History is consolid-
ated as that dimension of social existence in which
rebellion must always appear as essentially unreason-
able, if not mad or insensé – the dimension in which
it is, and always has been, wrong or unreasonable to
revolt (cf. LA,97). Themanichean clarity of revolt pre-
vails solely in the purity of the present, as an abrupt
interruption of any dialectical coordination of struc-
tural conditions and subjective responses. ‘Our most
profound metaphysical thesis, our “esoteric” thesis’,
Lardreau argues, is quite simply that ‘the past doesn’t
exist’ (LA, 21; cf. 57). As Lardreau observes in his
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Dialogues with the great historian of feudal society,
Georges Duby, history as such, history in general, is al-
ways written by the victorious few, driven at all times
by their fundamental ‘fear of the people’.36 History
does not recall ‘the way things were’ but only the way
the victors decide that they must have been, in or-
der for them to have contributed to what has since
become the established order of things. ‘Historical
memory is not Proustian ...; memory is an instru-
ment of mastery’, and it ‘retains only that which can
be, properly speaking, mastered.’37
What is perhaps more unexpected is the way in
which Lardreau’s subsequent reflection on mastery
itself comes to reframe his understanding of the ant-
agonism between master and rebel. If every actual re-
bellion leads to a renewal of mastery and submission,
could it also be that still more radical forms of sub-
mission, on the model of submission to an absolute
law, might renew potential rebellion? Could uncondi-
tional submission to a fully absolute or extra-worldly
master, a master beyond any relation ‘with’ rebels
who are themselves confined to this world, open an
alternative path to freedom from all worldly or his-
torical constraints?
This is the question Lardreau tackles in his read-
ing of the sixth-century Syriac ascetic Philoxenus of
Mabbug, Discours philosophique et discours spirituel
(1985). Once again he makes no secret of the Maoist
roots of the essential choice that separates ‘philosoph-
ical’ from ‘spiritual’ discourse, the choice between
reliance upon oneself, as the selfish subject of one’s
own petty mind, and the alienating-and-liberating
‘subversion through which the subject of thought is
affirmed as thought by the Other’, i.e. as the thought
and will of the creator or master who thinks through
me. In the Maoist context, such subversion allows
Mao to think of himself as thought by the masses,
such that to follow Mao demanded the ‘disappear-
ance of all thought of one’s own, all “selfish” thought,
so as to allow the masses to think me, by thinking
their thought in me. Hence that strange paramnesic
feeling that seizes any reader who moves from the
texts that express this Maoist subversion to our “spir-
itual” texts, or vice versa.’38 The Maoist militants do
not ‘think for themselves’; they are a vehicle for the
masses who think through them, and who alone de-
termine what must be thought. As Lardreau will later
point out, the Counter-Revolution grasped a version
of precisely the same point (to opposite ends), when
with Bonald it argued that the ‘first law’ of a revolu-
tion is that ‘those who believe they are directing it
are only its instruments’ (FD, 135).
The Christian name for our absolute master, of
course, is God, and what distinguishes its properly
‘spiritual’ mode of devotion is the individual’s fully
unconditional or absolute submission to the divine
will. The Christian ascetic seeks to eliminate all that
might block or filter his reception of divine instruc-
tion, in its simplicity and sufficiency, so as to be in a
position to receive ‘the word of God without judging
or scrutinising it, without trying to verify it, accepting
it with the same immediate self-evidence with which
the child accepts the authority of the master’.39 For
the ascetic, the decisive question is not whether or
not to believe in God, but simply that of believing
God, believing what God says, and thus of obeying
his commandments, without any need for evaluation
or justification. If classical philosophy offers the pro-
gressive clarification of a cogito, an ‘I think what I
am thinking’, this spiritual alternative offers the less
reflexive, more abrupt and more brutal ‘illumination
of a cogitor, through which the subject experiences
himself as that which is thought in thinking – in the
thinking of the Other’.40
Spiritual insight thus begins where the subject’s
own thinking ends, through an ascetic dis-propriation
of himself that is simultaneously a liberation in the
infinite transcendence of the altogether Other, an
‘silent illumination in which the Other seizes and cap-
tures him, enrols or enlists him, determines his place
and name, and subjects him to the treasure he was
seeking, and which found him’.41 I am no longer, in
short, the subject or author of my own thought, and
it is not me who progresses, but God who makes me
progress, insofar as I abolish myself as me .... The
sole path that is open to me, that might allow me to
render myself worthy of contemplation, is to empty
myself of all thought of my own, all thought that is
proper to myself [me vider de toute pensée propre]: in
the absolute silence of the intellect which, by desert-
ing itself, has finally regained, outside itself, its true
nature, God can come to imprint, as he originally did,
His contemplation.42
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Spiritual contemplation is liberation from desire, fi-
nitude and mortality, and it proceeds through abso-
lute submission to an infinitemaster. To rebel against
the limits of this world, and against the grain of its
historical development, may yet ‘succeed’, according
to this logic, if it is willing to submit to the will of a
master who transcends this world altogether.
III
La Véracité (1993), no doubt Lardreau’s most system-
atic and substantial philosophical work, is far from
a simple abnegation of his earlier voluntarism. As
one of its chapter titles confirms, the book adheres
both to the old slogan ‘on a raison de se révolter’, and
to the old dualism: ‘there are people who submit;
there are people who revolt’ (LV, 250).43 It is now
taken as self-evident that ‘History, as the place where
Reason waited for the highest good to be realised, has
failed’, but Lardreau insists that this should not be
interpreted as renegation of revolt as such. ‘Far from
this meaning that we must renounce the revolt that
was summoned by historical illusion, the only idea
that is rendered invalid is the idea that revolt might
one day find an end: my thesis does not serve to re-
strict rebellion, but to generalise it.’44 In a late text
Lardreau evokes with some sympathy themonth-long
‘insurrection des banlieues’ in France in the autumn of
2005 as an example of the sort of revolt he can still
affirm – a revolt without specific demands to pursue
or specific projects to implement, apart from a single
insistence, an ‘empty’ claim made on a pure idea in
the most Kantian sense: a demand for ‘respect’ as
such (FD, 158).45
If in La Véracité the abiding question persists, ‘is
there freedom, or not?’ (LV, 263n.10), what sets it
apart, however, from L’Ange and Singe is the strictly
negative configuration of its ‘superaffirmative’answer.
Lardreau’s later philosophy is negative in the same
sense as apophatic theology, which provides him with
his paradigm. If truth is divine and transcends our
finite means of expression, then ‘we can say noth-
ing true except the negative – or again: every affirm-
ative proposition is a fantasy, is the truth can only
ex-ist in relation to the soul as an event, i.e. as some-
thing purely unrepeatable’.46 Or in more Lacanian
terms, ‘every formof intelligibility stumbles upon a re-
mainder, a left-over, which interrupts its closure. This
remainder is the real itself’, which persists as ‘that
which can neither be said or understood.’47 Forever
lost behind the ‘wall of words’, this ungraspable real
‘tolerates only oblique statements’ that evoke its ab-
sence. In this context the proper function of fiction,
for instance, is not to create imaginary realities that
we might ‘possess’, but rather to indicate the cruel
limit of all imagination, to dramatise the irreducible
disjunction between discourse and world, and to al-
low for the experience of ‘an object of which no image
might form.’48 The Greek origins of philosophy it-
self, Lardreau argues, suggest that it stems from a
negative relation with the discourses that pre-existed
it, those of the physikoi, and then of the sophists;
philosophy will distinguish itself, then, by its lack of
any distinctive object or concern, and thus its lack
of any positive relation with ‘truth’ [la vérité].49 In
ways that are somewhat comparable with Adorno’s
later writings, a philosopher is mainly recognisable
here on account of a critical opposition to a prevail-
ing ‘positive’ dogma, e.g. to social convention, re-
vealed religion, political expediency, the ‘common
sense’ of self-preservation through adaptation to the
status quo. The Dreyfusards, to evoke an example
that Lardreau cites in 1998, did not stake their posi-
tion so much on the demonstrable ‘truth’ of Dreyfus’
innocence as on their quasi-instinctive opposition
to the socio-military establishment that condemns
him.50
Anegative conception of liberty, along these lines,
will be one that affirms a right to rebel against its
every encroachment or oppression (and thereby one
that implies the transcendental certainty of our free-
dom), but as far as actual practice is concerned, it will
affirm only a freedom to rebel against oppression, and
not one that might further become capable of taking
the positive steps needed to overcome it, or to estab-
lish a more just social order, or to accomplish any
particular political goal. Every time rebellions have
acquired ‘the opportunity to deploy their power, and
actually annihilate the regime they objected to’, so as
then to undertake the task of remaking society, the
result in each case has been ‘a horror beyond words’
(LV, 240). By thus severing the link between a wholly
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‘supersensible’ freedom and any worldly practice of
emancipation, Lardreau conflates will and wish while
at the same time eliminating any practical basis for
hope.
This conception of ‘negative liberty’ is itself part
of a fully systematic or ‘symphonic’ negative philo-
sophy, again organised along broadly Kantian lines.
The alternative approach, which Lardreau rejects,
would be one that (following Aristotle for instance)
starts out from positively given objects or situations,
such that our various interests are more or less dir-
ectly determined by these objects, e.g. our interest in
understanding the natural world, in organising our
collective life, in caring for our soul, and so on. If
a positive philosophy seeks to establish the truth
[vérité] of what it can know or experience, a negat-
ive philosophy will privilege the ‘véracité’ of a real
beyond experience and beyond our capacity to rep-
resent or reconstruct the logic and tendencies that
shape our experience. Here as everywhere, Lardreau’s
target is any ‘philosophy of life, of fullness, of ne-
cessity’,51 including ‘the party of Hegel and of Marx,
the party which refuses that there might be, between
what is and what should be, between the real and the
rational, any gap at all.’52 Between the negative as-
sertion that ‘nothing is all [rien n’est tout]’ and the
positive affirmation of an ‘absolute immanence’ that
might sustain and reconcile all realities, there is only
the stark opposition of a prise de parti.53 Against his
Aristotelian, Hegelian, Marxian, and also Deleuzian
adversaries, the ‘constitutional’ approach that Lardr-
eau adopts from Kant and Lacan is instead organised
around what falls outside its grasp, and that is thus
‘constitutionally’ free from access or interference.
This remains a ‘materialist’ approach, Lardreau
will insist, insofar as it rejects any spiritualist or vi-
talist alignment within some deeper form of reality,
and transcends any enclosure within an immanent
ontology. To be a negative materialist is to recognise
that
everything cannot be reduced to what we think, and
matter signifies the limit or stumbling block that,
whatever its progress, mind [l’esprit] cannot move
beyond, for it does not amount merely to an ordinary
insufficiency [of mind or thought] but rather informs
the law of its activity .... Amaterialist philosophy will
be one that represents to thought, as the last instance
or highest authority, the irrepresentable, that is, that
which sides with the Real.54
The French Counter-Revolution of the 1790s, for
instance, qualifies as eminently ‘materialist’ in this
peculiar sense, insofar as its critique of the Terror, of
its logic and its consequences, rests in the end, says
Lardreau, on the ‘brute sensory recognition’ of spilt
blood–the fact that ‘this, this that I see, and smell, this
is blood ...’ (FD, 25) – an acknowledgement of blood
as réel, compounded with reverence for its sacrificial
quality. Inspired by Lady Macbeth, the late Lardreau
maintains that ‘no trace of blood can be erased’ (FD,
105).
It also remains a rationalist approach, in keeping
with the axiom that equates reason and revolt, insofar
as it presumes that each distinct interest of reason
constitutes or ‘produces the reality it is interested
in, while also letting fall away a real [un réel]’ that
eludes it (LV, 211): reason is always ‘interested in
something other than that which, since it institutes
it, it can know’ (LV, 220). Theoretical reason is con-
cerned with understanding the laws that regulate the
way things appear in the world we perceive and exper-
ience, but recognises that the world thus constituted
is not ‘whole’ or not-all (the subject is never simply
a part of the empirical world, and is unable to con-
stitute every aspect of that world), and that there is
a real or noumenal dimension that falls outside the
domain of appearance.55 Practical reason, by con-
trast, can access this noumenal freedom by indicating
its own ‘suprasensible’ vocation, but only at the cost
of neglecting the sensible, singular character of any
particular individual (LV, 244).
More specifically, practical reason or freedom is
here subject to at least three sorts of negative limita-
tion. It is limited, first of all, to a strictly private or in-
dividual sphere. Collective power and sovereign force
rely in the end on themore or less intelligent ‘exercise
of violence, be it that of the prince or the rebel.’ Power
remains a matter of positive capacity by definition,
one that can make possible that which has hitherto
seemed impossible (LV, 222). Whether it be long es-
tablished or in the throes of revolutionary change,
society privileges what it takes to be the collective
good over individual dissent, and society as such al-
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ways tends to ‘stifle’ the unique idiosyncrasies of an
individual, in favour of a ‘particular group’ or class
and its shared priorities. The more it affirms a gen-
eralised will, precisely, the more a social group tends
toward what appears as the totalitarian horizon of
every social formation, or what Lardreau derides here
as ‘society-without-toilets [la société-sans-chiottes],
in which the subject will never find any obscene recess
where surveillance ceases, and where he can enjoy his
singular difference.’56
Against this logic of collective conformism, Lardr-
eau concludes that the only subject who can affirm
the principle ‘on a toujours raison de se révolter’ must
be the individual sensu stricto. On the one hand, indi-
viduals not only have no social power, they also have
no social reality, since the abstract category of ‘an indi-
vidual’ corresponds to no actual, social-determinate
person. The individual as such falls out of the socially
constituted world, and for that very reason may evoke
the dimension of the real (LV, 220).57 The individual
is thus the only subject who can uphold themoral law,
which itself testifies to the real or noumenal dimen-
sion par excellence, i.e. to a freedom that we can never
positively experience or know. The moral law runs
counter to established social interests or realities as a
matter of course, precisely because it commands us to
act in ways that might be affirmed, indifferently and
universally, by all individuals, always and everywhere,
regardless of their social position or capacity, as ef-
fectively ‘interchangeable’.58 Only a universal law or
right can honour every individual assertion of singu-
larity. On the other hand, the individual is also the
only subject who is existentially concerned with his
or her own happiness or suffering. Again inverting the
priorities of Singe, Lardreau now affirms a properly
‘pathological’ duty, ‘a duty to make oneself happy’,
in neo-Epicurean pursuit of a ‘private happiness [le
bonheur privé]’ (LV, 197, 202).
In this fully privatised domain our ethical choices,
in short, can no longer be justified through reference
to any actually-ongoing historical project or political
goal, and must instead proceed ‘in the absence of any
project on a world scale’, ‘in the absence of any plan or
intention that is not emphatically selfish [égoïste]’ (LV,
201). It follows that rebellion is only as legitimate as
its object is evanescent and its subject isolated, such
that ‘the most pure revolts will not at all be those that
boast the most “sublime” ambitions, and that signal a
radical will to “change the world”, but on the contrary,
those that lower themselves to the slightest objects,
the most humble and most transparent things’ (LV,
249).
Freedom is further limited, in the second place,
by the fact that its exercise, or existence, can only be
presupposed (in keeping with the argument of Kant’s
second Critique) through the experience of pure com-
mandment or law. What sustains a ‘negative politics’
is solely its capacity to interrupt any proposal that
might violate the moral law and the rights that fol-
low from that law: human rights are only worthy of
veneration since they condemn, without any concern
for context or content, any project that might treat
some individuals as means to a positive, socially de-
termined end.59 ‘The notion of right’ is precisely that
‘pure idea of a form, without any empirical content’
(LV, 213; cf. LM, 43) which forecloses any such pro-
ject. Grounded solely in the ‘pure universality of the
law,’ free from all natural or historical determination,
human rights now ‘represent, with regard to politics,
what is ethically imprescriptible.’60
In defending this wholly formal conception of
moral obligation, Lardreau’s position is indeed, as
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he describes it, ‘more Kantian than Kant’s own’ (LV,
150), and he rallies behind Kant at precisely that point
where he has most often been attacked, by Hegel and
so many of those who have followed Hegel. Lardr-
eau’s negative formalism allows him to respond to
Hegel’s critique of Kant’s abstraction and universal-
ism by interpreting indifference to pragmatic content
and socio-historical actuality as a virtue rather than
a defect. What sustains the moral law is precisely the
fact that it must be postulated, in the most radically
abstract sense, as a pure norm that can for that very
reason apply to any individual and every situation.61
Hegel is quite right to claim that Kant has no interest
in social reality or actuality – but this is precisely
because Kant’s sole concern is with the supra-social
and supra-sensible ‘real’ of absolute self-legislation,
whose every commandment is immediately ‘concrete’
in the sense that it applies unequivocally to every
individual, in every situation. From Lardreau’s ‘de-
siccated’ Kantian perspective, it is rather Hegel’s po-
sition that is abstract, and suspect, since it allows
for the suspension of moral criteria in deference to
an apparent ‘meaning or direction of History’ that
Hegel presumes rather than proves. Hegel avoids the
real of moral duty, in short, because he aligns him-
self with and acquiesces to an imaginary ‘reality’ of
socio-historical progress,which is itself nothingmore
than the retrospective rationalisation of our actually-
established order (LV, 169). If Hegel’s subjects are
situated according to time, place and the specific cul-
tural resources of their ‘ethical life’, Lardreau’s neo-
Kantian ‘subject is only practical on condition that he
see himself as if he was himself the law’, the law that
transcends every situation. Strictly speaking, ‘there
is no other subject than the law as such’ (LV, 183),
whose commands apply in the same way across all
situations.
In the third and most fundamental place, then,
again in line with this affirmation of Kant over Hegel,
freedom is both limited and absolutised here by its
isolation from the dimension of actuality altogether.
Lardreau’s freedom is properly nothing other than
a freedom to posit ourselves as free from reality or
actuality tout court, in an affirmation that is absolute
and unconditional as it is negative and empty. Of
such a pure postulation, ‘nothing can be predicated,
since it can only be represented as the power to begin
absolutely, as freedom’ (LV, 153).62 This neo-Kantian
approach enables Lardreau to salvage his notion of
freedom from both psychological and historical com-
promises. Understood as a positive or natural capacity,
for instance as a primordial spontaneity or anarchic
appetite, freedom can only be understood as in ten-
sion with itself, whereby (as with Plato, or Freud) one
part of the psyche must strive to command the other.
By contrast, if following Lardreau’s Kant we conceive
of freedom from the negative experience of command-
ment and obligation alone, then we can stabilise the
ground of freedom in the sole dimension of practical
reason – albeit at the cost of confining it to this one
dimension.
The same logic allows Lardreau to retain a sub-
lime or ‘angelic’ conception of politics, by confining
it to the vanishing present of a pure refusal or re-
jection of what is actually established. The angel
now figures what can be presented or embodied of
our unpresentable, disembodied freedom, our ‘real’
noumenal freedom from all embodied desire, all dif-
ference, all inequalities, our ‘death to the world’ (LV,
240–41). As soon as we try to turn this ‘real’ into the
basis of an actually-existing ‘reality’, however, the
angel becomes a figure of death pure and simple, a
barbarian figure of absolute lawlessness or crime. In
keeping with the Lacanian distinction of le réel and
la réalité (whereby the latter is an imaginary social
construct, sustained through collective delusion and
conformism), Lardreau classifies this barbarian an-
gel as ‘the Angel of imaginarisation’: exemplified by
Stalinist totalitarianism, it incarnates the pitiless de-
termination to make an egalitarian mirage the basis
of a new social reality. Through such ‘imaginarisa-
tion of rebellion’, ‘rebellion abandons the negativity
that lent it its power, and is impregnated with a full
positivity, and grows into the wish to become, itself,
the new state.’63
In a late twist to his angelic typology, Lardreau
gives the name ‘cannibal angel’ to the figure that
might seek, refusing all imaginary réalisation, to refer
us back to the Lacano-Kantian dimension of a ‘real
beyond reality’. This cannibal angel of réellisation
incarnates
the will to bring every world back to the chaos that is
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its truth, to bring every community back to its essen-
tial dispersal, to dissolve every tie [lien], beginning
with that tie by which a body is a body. The back-
ground against which this Angel detaches the liber-
ation of the subject from any relation of authority
is nothing other than the ruin of relation in general.
Like the Terror as described by Hegel, its politics is a
politics of absolute freedom, that is to say, of death.
And since, when all is said and done, this Angel will
associate only with these dismembered bodies, I will
call it the Cannibal Angel.64
Whereas the barbaric imaginary relates the will to
its realisation and deludes its subjects with the ‘posit-
ivity of a content’ (the promise of a new social order),
the cannibal angel preserves the integrity of the real
as such, precisely by absolving it from any sort of
positivity, realisation, or relation. After initially asso-
ciating the Khmer Rouge and the Cultural Revolution
with the barbarian imaginary,65 in his last political
writings Lardreau classifies them instead under this
other, more ‘complicated’ though no less destructive
form of ‘abjection’, ‘that by which negativity, far from
renouncing itself, goes right to the very limit of itself.’
The Khmer ultimately deserve to be recognised as a
subject of réellisation rather than réalisation insofar
as they were driven less by the ambition to constitute
a new imaginary society than by the deathly determ-
ination simply to ‘destroy their people, which is to
say themselves.’66 In less extreme forms, Lardreau
suggests that the cannibal figure may at least be com-
patible with a minimal sense of self-preservation and
indeed self-love. Thus understood in its most ‘affirm-
ative’ sense, so to speak, ‘the Cannibal Angel does not
“delude” [ne “leurre” pas] … it liberates negation from
any determinacy to which it might be applied’ and its
mode of subjectivation offers no ‘prognostic, thera-
peutic, or practical value’, other than a recognition
that what is thus liberated from relation and imagin-
ary relations remains a real individual, an individual
with the ‘pathological duty’ to look after itself.67
If we are to avoid social catastrophe, then, Lardr-
eau insists that freedom must remain a pure end in
itself, absolved of any means that might realise it and
of any relation to an obstacle that might thwart it.
The only way to uphold our unconditional duty to
rebel against any and every infringement upon our
freedom is to restrain our very desire to destroy the
cause of such infringement (LV, 243). Revolt is only
justified if it is for nothing, or next to nothing – ‘for
two pennies’ (LV, 249), or for a mere acknowledgement
of ‘respect’ (FD, 158). Even a Christian restraint from
confronting the injustices of this world is here not
restrained enough, if it simply defers the advent of
justice to another world (LV, 247). In Kantian terms,
what Lardreau affirms is a conception of duty purged
of any assurance – an assurance on which Kant him-
self so often insists – that we are actually capable of
carrying it out. To the extent that will (as distinct
fromwish) is a matter of capacity and realisation, this
is duty severed even from the will to follow it.68 One
and the same duty both commands us to continue
in the old project of revolt, and to despair of ever
carrying it out.
IV
Lardreau’s ultimate position doesn’t simply equate
an absolute but wholly abstracted conception of re-
volt with resigned acceptance of the status quo. In
his last writings, he seeks to inject such acceptance
with a sort of exaltation of its own, as if a sufficiently
radical and unquestioning submission might now it-
self retain some of the ascetic self-denying and self-
overcoming qualities he earlier associated with Mao-
ism and Syriac discipline. Some of the main points
of reference here might seem to be as far removed
from his early invocations of Rousseau and Mao as
can be imagined: the far-right nationalism of Charles
Maurras and Action Française (albeit one qualified
by a passing appreciation for Blanqui and the Com-
munards of 1871), combined with a fascination for
the ultra-Catholic and ultra-royalist partisans of the
French Counter-Revolution.69 The concision and syn-
tactical contortions characteristic of Lardreau’s later
writing are even more extreme in his last fragments,
but as always he strives to find continuity beneath ap-
parent contraries. The anti-authoritarian inflection
of his early Maoism, he now readily admits, was itself
always compatible with unquestioning reverence for
another conception of mastery, one in which reveren-
tial obedience and radical emancipation from oneself
are opposite sides of the same coin.
In keeping with the whole philosophical tradition,
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always, I have taken as my maxim the crude slogan
of liberation: sapere aude – dare to give yourself a
master! Everything else is feigned freedom, and real
slavery: in my youth, to be anti-authoritarian meant
being prepared to shout ‘Long live President Mao!
Only cretins saw in this a demand for submission (FD,
120).
And he adds, in his increasingly provocative style,
that today ‘I persevere in saying: long live comrade
Stalin, long live President Mao, may they live, with
the Virgin Mary, for ten thousand years!’ (FD, 120).
The path that began with the opposition of master
and rebel has come full circle.
It’s precisely the mass veneration that can sur-
round a figure like Mary, or the saints, or a pope (FD,
71–76), that lends Catholicism its trans-historical
‘grandeur’, and allows it to persist as an enduring
framework for popular unity, and to preserve the in-
tegrity of popular traditions. The greatness of Catholi-
cism seems to rest precisely in the transcendent aura
with which it invests the figures it reveres. The Re-
formation, by contrast, stands condemned precisely
for its rejection of all aura, reverence and mastery,
and for its reckless assertion of freedom from tran-
scendent authority – a merely selfish and self-centred
freedom that can only turn subjects against them-
selves, as they try to devise substitute forms of self-
mastery or autonomy that divide body from mind,
and desire from conscience. Catholicism engineers
more or less ‘blind’ forms of mass unanimity, and the
more instinctive or ‘involuntary’ its reflexes the more
immediately they operate, and the more profoundly
they resonate; Protestantism, by contrast, begins and
ends with all too deliberate schisms. Lardreau is now
perfectly ready to accept that ‘the Inquisition is the
truth of Catholicism’, and seems willing to embrace it
as an acceptable price to pay for maintaining a collect-
ive faith; on the other hand, ‘this or that imbecile sect
–Mormons, Christian Scientists, Pentecostals [etc...]
– are the truth of Protestantism, which only exists in
the form of sects’ (FD, 121). As for the fading figure of
revolution, it appears from a counter-revolutionary
perspective as little more than a wilful, infantile de-
fiance of genuinely ingrained authority – or citing
Bonald, ‘the revolution is “the badly raised child elev-
ated to the highest level of power” ’ (FD, 136).
It’s hard to imagine how Lardreau might have
pushed his ‘dialectic of the will’ any further along
the road of absolute negation. In the process, and
leaving aside the intrinsic interest of such a properly
idiosyncratic and intransigent philosophical project,
Lardreau provides a striking and suitably negative
lesson for anyone still interested in the concept and
practice of political will. The more we absolutise the
will, the more we isolate volition from the domain of
actuality, the more we empty it of all those qualities
and capacities that enable its exercise.
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